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Who Pays in the End?
Residential Developers' 'Rule of Thumb'
and the Incidence of Regulatory Costs
Michael I, Luger and Kenneth M. Temkin
Since the turn of the century, governments have placed restrictions on the
location and characteristics ofnew buildings, the primary reason being the rec-
ognition that new construction created negative side-effects for surrounding
residents.' Consequently, it is difficult for most housing analysts to advocate
eliminating all government regulations relating to housing production. How-
ever, there is disagreement among housing policy observers about what level
of regulations is socially desirable. The key task of researchers is to establish
the costs of regulation so that the benefits of these regulations, which accrue
both to the home buyer and residents of the larger neighborhood, can be com-
pared to the costs incurred by housing consumers. Therefore, proper measure-
ment ofregulation costs is an essential element of any policy debate surround-
ing regulatory reform of the housing development process.
Many studies have attempted to quantify the effect of government regula-
tions on home prices. A large number of these studies identified a positive and
significant relationship between home prices in a given geographic area and the
presence ofregulations, such as large-lot zoning requirements, growth controls
and subdivision standards (for an excellent review of this large body of litera-
ture see Fischel 1990). Moreover, some housing market analysts argue that
home ownership has moved beyond the reach of many Amencan families be-
cause of the costs associated with complying with uimecessary government
regulations.^ While providing some evidence of the effect of government regu-
lations, there has been little research about the decision process used by devel-
opers when faced with government regulations. Therefore, previous studies
have concluded that regulatory costs have one of two effects. Some studies
show costs are passed forward on a dollar-for-dollar basis to consumers in the
form of higher prices. Alternatively, some studies show government regulations
are passed back to landowners in the form of lower values for developable
land.'
In this article, we argue that the ratio of the effects of regulations on home
prices to the costs borne by developers is greater than one. Many developers
work under a "rule-of-thumb" that home prices should be between two to four
times the price paid for land. Consequentiy, government regulations that
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result in relatively small increases in land costs can
result in large increases in the asking price for new
home. For example, a regulation that results in an
additional $10,000 in costs to the developer would
acmally be passed on to the buyer as a $20,000 to
$40,000 increase in final costs. Obviously, market
conditions wiU affect the ultimate price paid by con-
sumers; however, to a certain extent, new home prices
will reflect some multiple of regulatory costs associ-
ated with the development process. If so, regulators
must be aware that regulations with seemingly modest
effects on land prices may result in relatively high
increases to newly constructed home prices.
The remainder of this article is organized into four
sections. The next section presents a schematic model
of a developea-'s decision calculus along with a discus-
sion ofhow government regulations affect the devel-
opment process. In the third section, we develop a
model to explain why government regulations would
have a multiphed effect on prices. In the fourth sec-
tion, "Methods and Analysis," we present our research
methodology and results. The final section provides a
discussion of the policy impHcations of our findings.
A Conceptual Framework
Figiire 1 illustrates a developer's decision calcu-
lus. The model is predicated on the assumption that a
developer has some predetermined notion of both the
types of regulations they will face and the time needed
to complete the project. Therefore, a developer's
decisions wiU reflect the answers to several questions.
Did they know beforehand what the restrictions were,
and then factor them into project planning? How did
he or she respond to the restrictions: By seeking to
change them? By offering less for the land than he or
she otherwise would? By changing project design? By
changing the pricing of units? Or did he or she miscal-
culate the costs or delays so that the bottom line was
reduced?
The development environment that exists when a
developer contemplates a project includes several
components. There is the aspect of market demand
(the types of units the buying pubhc wants bmlt), an
element affected by macxoeconomic conditions, demo-
graphics, and tastes. The financial resources available
to the developer is a factor affected by macroeconomic
conditions and the developer's past success. The
development environment also incorporates the regu-
latory miheu, which includes apphcable ordinances
and statutes, precedent, and practice in particular
places.
Once a developer decides to embark on a project
(taking into account the three factors just discussed),
he or she attempts to find land that is "priced right."
That may mean land that is part of a bankruptcy or
under Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) control ~
resulting its being priced under market value. On the
other hand, the parcel may be so large that it is afford-
able for only well-capitalized buyers. The developer's
search for the right price may also mean a seller will
accede to terms the developer considers favorable,
including a discoimted sale price, or a sale conditional
on obtaining necessary approvals.
The price of land should reflect whether it has ap-
provals in place. If it does, building can begin prior to
final approvals for foundations, hookups, or other
such items. There may be delays, but they normally
will be shorter than in the absence of prior approvals.
When land is bought without approvals, the developer
must seek them. Whether or not a developer paid a
"proper price" for land will depend on how long and
costly the approval process was relative to what he or
she expected. A developer obviously wants to get to
the sellout stage as quickly as possible. If there are
unexpected delays along the way, market demand may
have changed, making the product hard to sell at the
desired price. If land is bought outright, there are also
carrying costs associated with delays.
Both the timing of the development process and
the accuracy of all actors' expectations determine the
incidence of the regulatory burden. In a world of
perfect information — no stirprises — and complete
mobihty of capital, stricter requirements for develop-
ers and longer delays would not negatively affect
developers in the long run. If they acted rationally,
they would not stay in the development business if
they could not earn a risk-adjusted, economy-viide,
average rate of return. Rather than tie their resources
up in building, and earning, say, a 6 percent rate of
return, they would seek higher returns by, say, invest-
ing in equities or manufacturing widgets. That would
reduce the supply ofhousing being buUt and raise the
price because of excess demand. That should induce
more builders into the regulated market. Consequently,
the likely long-run incidence is either on homebuyers,
who pay higher prices, or on landowners, who receive
lower offers, or both.
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Figure 1: Model ofa developer's decision-making process
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However, the incidence of regulation costs is also
affected by the fact that there is a limit on what home-
buyers can spend annxiaUy for a house, normally about
30 percent of gross income. As the cost of regulation
drives up housing prices, demand falls and the bottom
end of the housing market drops out, leaving mostly
high-end houses in the building pipeline. Thus, lower
and middle-income households bear the burden, not
simply through higher home ownership costs, but
through the unavaUabUity ofhomes in their price range.
Presumably, rents rise as well, in which case there is a
loss of consumer surplus. Or there could be a welfare
loss due to doubling up, Uving with parents, Uving
farther away from work where housing is less expen-
sive, and so on.
The outcomes of the regulatory processes we de-
scribe may deviate from what legislators and regulators
intended when drafting statutes, ordinances, and rules.
For example, staff shortages tend to create delays in
appUcation reviews. In addition, miiltiple reviews at
different levels of government extend the permitting
timeline and may lead to inconsistent discretionary
requirements. Also, regulators who have some flexibil-
ity (to accommodate a wide range of sound proposals)
sometimes use it to deny or delay projects that may be
in technical coropliance but faU to meet the spirit of the
rules. Similarly, pubhc hearings and court appeals,
intended in part to ensure that government officials
foUow the rules, are also powerful tools for opponents
of developments. Foes can use hearings to poUticize an
appro\'al process and convince elected officials not to
foUow the rules, or to delay and/or kill projects.
A Model of the Effects
of Regulation on Home Prices
Our working hypothesis is that some costs of
regvilation resulting from factors discussed above will
result in price increases that are greater than the actual
costs borne by the developer. This hypothesis is based
on the simphfied housing production model in Equation
1:
H = AS"L^ (1)
H is the output of housing, measured as a bundle
that includes land and biuldings; S and L represent
structures and land, respectively; and A , a , and /3
are parameters that represent neutral technical progress
and the shares of structures and land in production.
respectively. Assuming constant or shghtly increasing
economies of scale, CC and fi will each be less than 1.
Differentiating (1) with respect to land ( 9 H/ 3 L),
and setting that equal to the real "rental rate" on land
(r), as would be appropriate in long-run equihbrium,
yields the expression shown in Equation 2:
PH =-
P (2)
Here, pH is the cost ofhousing and rL is the cost
of the land required for its production. A doUar change
in the numerator on the right hand side, due, for exam-
ple, to regulation, changes the left hand side by more
than a dollar, as long as /3 is less than one. For exam-
ple, for a parameter value of 0.5, a dollar increase in
the cost of land (rL) woidd have to be accompanied by
a two-dollar increase in the cost ofhousing (pH) for the
equahty to hold.
The smaller )S is (less than one), the larger ApH
for any doUar change in rL. Since /3 is directiy pro-
portional to the elasticity of demand for housing with
respect to the price of land, we can see that less elastic
demand allows regulatory costs to be passed forward
more readily. Because land is unmobUe, there should be
a lower ovm-price elasticity of demand for it than for
structures (this was theorized by Sommervflle in 1996).
This hypothesis was tested using data collected from
builder/developers in New Jersey. A discussion of the
data and the results foUow in the next section.
Methods and Analysis
The results presented in this paper are derived
from a larger study of developers and regulators in New
Jersey and North Carolina.'* As part of the study we
conducted two types of primary data collection efforts.
The first type of data collected was from questionnaires
mailed to a stratified sample of 850 builders/developers
in New Jersey. (The sample was stratified in order to
ensure geographic coverage of the entire state.) Two
hundred biulders/developers throughout the state were
randomly selected to receive a "short" questionnaire;
longer questionnaires were sent to the remaining 650
buUder/developers in each of four regions: the New
York commuting shed; the Route 1 corridor; the Phila-
delphia commuting shed; and elsewhere in the state .
(Luger, et al., 1998, presents details of the survey
methodology, sampling strategy, and validity issues.)
Because our initial response rate was low (approxi-
mately 12 percent), we expanded our sample size for
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the short form by 300; we also sent several hundred
replacement questionnaires to the original sample.
The second type of data collected came from tele-
phone interviews with 66 builder/developers drawn
from the same sample as our mail survey. We divided
the interviewed parties into four panels. The first panel
of respondents was asked the following questions:
Assuming that there is a demand in your market for
completed homes selling for $500,000 on half-acre
lots:
In a typical case, what is the most you would put
into the hard costs to build the house and appur-
tenances (brick, lumber and direct labor?)
In a typical situation what is the most you would
pay for that improved lot, with all approvals in
place (construction, subdivision, and environ-
mental)? (Disregard the possibility ofadditional
costsfor impact fees, dedications, etc.)
Again in a typical case, what is the most you
would have paid for that same lot in a subdivi-
sion if approvals were in place, but without any
improvements?
What is the most you would have paid for that
same lot in a subdivision, but without either ap-
provals or improvements?
We also asked these questions to the same panel of
biiilder/developers for a $500,000 home on a two-acre
lot. Panel Two was asked the same questions for half-
and two-acre lots, but for a $250,000 selling price.
Panel Three was asked the questions for a $125,000
home on a half- acre lot, and Panel Four for a $750,000
home on two acres.
The "willingness to pay" questions are consistent
with the contingent valuation approach commonly used
in environmental research. In this case, our purpose
was to ascertain how builders value approvals and
improvements. We used differently valued properties to
account for possible non-linearities in the demand
curve. Table 1 reports the mean values.
Note that the price paid for improved, approved
land plus the cost of non-land improvements do not
sum to the selling price. In part, this is a consequence
of the data distribution (summing mean values); how-
ever there is also a profit margin to consider.
The table indicates the following rates of return to
builder/developers
:
For a $750,000 home on 2 acres: 23.7 percent
For a $500,000 home on V2 acre: 22.6 percent
For a $500,000 home on 2 acres: 25.3 percent
For a $250,000 home on V2 acre: 13.4 percent
For a $250,000 home on 2 acres: 8.9 percent
For a $125,000 home on V2 acre: 13.0 percent
Those estimates are consistent with what devel-
oper/builders claim in foUow-up interviews among a
subsample of questionnaire respondents: that higher
rates of return accrue to higher-valued property, per-
haps because the price elasticity of demand for housing
is relatively small for the highest income households,
allowing more regulatory costs to be passed forward.
(Note that the figures are rough proxies of actual rates
of return, because they do not include financing costs,
and are not annuahzed.) The longer a development
project takes, the lower the annualized rate of return,
which is the relevant indicator of financial viabihty.
The data in Table 1 roughly agree with our mail survey
responses from New Jersey builder/ developers. The
median price of new homes buUt by our respondents
was $236,000, and the median size of a developed lot
was 0.8 acres. The raw land component of that parcel
was $24,000, and the median per parcel cost for im-
provements was $27,900.
The responses in Table 1 can be translated into the
costs for approved, unimproved and improved, ap-
proved lots, as shown in Table 2.
The offering prices in the table are hypothetical.
For example, a developer would be willing to pay
$27 , 1 87 more for unimproved land with approvals than
for unimproved land without approvals for a planned
$500,000 home on half an acre. As expected, the more
expensive a home, the larger this difference. (Note that
the relatively small differences between the mean
values for one-half acre and two-acre lots were not
significant as measured by a t-test.) The first row in
each panel of the table also provides a basis for esti-
mating improvement costs, which range from 10.7
percent to 15.1 percent of the sales price. It is worth-
while to note that the written developer surveys re-
vealed that hypothetical cost of improvements, if
weighted by the mix of different-valued homes in New
Jersey, would be in the $22,000 range. The survey
responses indicated that per-lot improvements were
11.8 percent of the sales price.
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Table 1: Summary ofdeveloper survey results
Panel One: $500,000 house
1/2 acre lot 2 acre lot
Mean value No. responses Mean value No. responses
Non-land costs $273,077 13 1258,750 12
Improved lot 134,615 13 140,357 14
Raw approved land 84,545 11 78,654 13
Raw unapproved land 51,696 14 56,125 14
Panel Two: $250,000 house
1/2 acre lot 2 acre lot
Mean value No. responses Mean value No. responses
Non-land costs $135,845 25 $139,026 19
Improved lot 84,700 25 91,024 21
Raw approved land 46,888 20 55,515 17
Raw unapproved land 30,475 20 31,053 19
I
Panel Three: $125,000 house
1/2 acre lot
Mean value No responses
Non-land costs $76,024 21
Improved lot 34,643 21
Raw approved land 21,235 17
Raw unapproved land 17,343 19
Panel Four: $750,000 house
2 acre lot
Mean value No. responses
Non-land costs $404,417
Improved lot 201,758
Raw approved land 94,583
Raw vmapproved land 55,417
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Table 2: Costs ofapprovals and improvements
Panel One: $500,000 house
Mean value
1/2 acre lot
Improvements (for approved land) 155,000
Approvals (for unimproved land) 27,187
Improvements and approvals 80,480
2 acre lot
160,193
25,903
84,233
Panel Two: $250,000 house
Mean value
1/2 acre lot 2 acre lot
Improvements (for approved land) |42,511
Approvals (for unimproved land) 16,381
Improvements and approvals 53,833
$44,630
18,035
60,068
Panel Three: $125,000 house
Mean value
1 /2 acre lot 2 acre lot
Improvements (for approved land) |21,559
Approvals (for unimproved land) 1,983
Improvements and approvals 22,014
n/a
n/a
n/a
Panel Four: $750,000 house
Mean value
1 /2 acre lot 2 acre lot
Improvements (for approved land) n/a
Approvals (for unimproved land) n/a-
Improvements and approvals n/a
3128,610
39,167
175,610
Table 2 is based on the assumption that developers
have a target market in mind when undertaking proj-
ects, and changes in the cost of approvals affect the
pricing of land. However, this is an extreme assump-
tion. Consider, for example, a $125,000 house on a
half-acre lot. A landowner may agree to sell that lot
without approvals or improvements, not for $17,434,
but for $20,000. A developer would then assess
whether the extra $2,600 could be passed onto a buyer,
or if he or she could Mve with a lower rate of return.
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The answer depends on market conditions in a particu-
lar place at a particular moment in time (as reflected in
the price elasticity of demand).
The issue of the incidence of cost changes for
structures and land was addressed empirically by
SomerviUe (1996). He demonstrated that unexpected
changes in the cost of land, such as those due to unan-
ticipated regulatory delays, are borne in the short run
by builders or developers in lower profits, but unex-
pected increases in the cost of a structure can be passed
on to consumers in higher fmal prices. Therefore,
"bunder behavior would be expected to be much more
sensitive to land costs because they directly affect the
builder's bottom line^". Over time, diminished supply
would affect prices through normal supply and demand
adjustments.
In addition to being supported by the contingent
valuation data, the rule-of-thumb multipher is also
evident in our analysis of mail surveys from New
Jersey builder/developers. Eight respondents estimated
the median increase in the price of a house due to
zoning restrictions (which required them to change the
design and/or layout of their projects) to be $50,000.
Using the multiplier of 4.0 for the ratio between sales
price changes and raw land price value, that estimate
should translate backward into a raw land price differ-
ence of $12,500. Indeed, the respondents who provided
an estimate of the change in raw land value due to
zoning restrictions gave a median figure of approxi-
mately $7,000. The higher impUed multiplier (close to
7.0) is most likely an artifact of the small unrepresen-
tative sample of builder/developers responding to that
question, but it is of the right order of magnitude.
These findings indicate that there is more than a
housing prices, the extent of which wUl vary from
project to project depending on local conditions, house
size, land-to-structures ratio, and other factors. This
translation occurs whether the cost of regulation is
accounted for in the non-land (structures) or land
component of the housing biondle, since both share
parameters, j3 and a, , are less than 1. However, it is
greater for those elements of land costs since /3 <a
.
That relationship helps us tinderstand the relation-
ship between home prices and regulation costs in some
of the survey responses. Builder/developers indicated,
for example, that open space set-asides caused them to
raise the price of a median finished unit by $3,500.
Using a multiplier of 4.0, that means that the actual
outlay for additional land was about $900 per unit.
Similarly, delay costs tend to translate into higher sales
prices with this multipher effect. For example, we
noted earher that each 12-month delay adds approxi-
mately $1,500 per unit in additional carrying costs,
which would translate into at most $6,000 more for a
buyer. These price translations reflect long-run re-
sponses to regulatory costs; in the short-term, builders
react in a variety of ways to regulatory costs.
While our findings are based on a relatively small
sample, the consistency of the results derived from both
the contingent valuation and survey data suggest that a
rule-of-thumb is used in practice by developers when
determining the optimal capital/land ratio of production
costs. Increases in the cost of raw land or the cost of
improved land are passed along to consumers in
amotmts greater than the costs paid by developers.
Lx)cal circimistances dictate the ultimate incidence of
government regulations, but buUder/developers attempt
to maintain a fixed capital/land cost ratio when devel-
oping an initial asking price. The pohcy inqjhcations of
this result are discussed in the concluding section.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
The fact that the elasticity of demand for housing
with respect to price is less than zero has another
important consequence: a dollar added to the price of
land due to the capitalization of the required regulatory
approval adds more than a dollar to the final selling
price. That multipher ranges from two to six, depend-
ing on the value of the property being sold as well as on
the way land-price is measured (with or without im-
provements in place). In general, a multipher of four is
not unreasonable; this means that when a developer
expects regulation to cost a doUar (substantively or in
procedural delay), on average he or she will attenpt to
increase by $4 the price of the houses being built.
The phrase "on average" is important, because
survey data showed a wide range of actual experiences
among builder/developers. Of 57 respondents to a
question about the incidence of subdivision require-
ments, for example, 19 indicated they changed the offer
price for land, and 19 said they changed the pricing of
units. Similarly, of 64 respondents, 22 said stringent
zoning affects their offer-prices for land, while 10 said
it affected their selling prices. In addition, 74 of 230
respondents indicated lower land-price offers in re-
sponse to environmental regulations, while 39 said they
charged more for a house. Moreover, the median re-
sponse by all respondents was that environmental
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regulations reduced a developer's bottom line by 1
percentage point.
To conclude, our article suggests that regulatory
costs to consumers, in certain circumstances, may
exceed costs borne by builder/developers. Many devel-
opers describe a rule-of-thumb where land costs make-
up a fixed percentage (usually around 25 percent) of
the asking price for new homes. As a result, relatively
modest additional costs for land resulting from gov-
ernment regulation may translate into sizeable price
increases faced by consvimers of new housing. If true,
regulators must be keenly aware of the full cost impacts
of additional regulations in order to generate an accu-
rate cost-benefit assessment of regtiia|^ns initiated to
foster socially desirable objectives.
Endnotes
'Lubove, 1981.
Advisory Commission on Regulatory Barriers to Afford-
able HoTisiag, 1991, Lowry and Ferguson, 1992, Na-
tional Association of Homebuilders, 1995.
^ Dealdn 1989, Knapp and Nelson 1988, Wachter and Cho
1991.
"Lugeretal, 1988.
Luger et al., 1998, presents details of the survey method-
ology, sanqiling strategy, and validity issues.
The contingent valuation approach is a technique used to
value benefits or resources through the construction of
a hypothetical situation. Individuals are surveyed and
asked to value the good in question based on informa-
tion presented in the background scenario. For more
information, refer to Paterson, Luger and Lindsay
1995.
SomerviUe, p. 410.
This translates into 2.54 percent of the median housing
price per year, or 0.2 percent per month This is less
than the 1.2 percent per month estimated by Seidel
(1978), which presumably reflects changes in interest
rates and housing values since that time.
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